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ABSTRACT 
Iran has been expanding its influence globally by utilizing a large network of 
proxy organizations outside of the state’s borders. These various proxy networks have 
been successful in implementing Iranian foreign policy while maintaining a distant 
relationship to the state. The use of proxy networks is not a new concept, yet Iran has had 
long-term success while other states within the region have had difficulties with proxy 
employment. This thesis examines whether Iran’s effectiveness in utilizing proxies 
through the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is a sustainable foreign policy option to 
promote Iranian regional interests. 
This thesis finds that Iran thus far has been successful with managing the balance 
between proxy clients and the relationships of political leaders, especially within the Iraqi 
state. It is ascertained that Iran’s employment of proxy clients will continue to remain a 
cost-effective means of expanding its influence and implementing Iranian foreign policy 
goals while retaining the ability to distance itself from the client as needed. 
Furthermore, the large-scale success that the Iranian-backed organizations have seen 
while fighting under the PMF, and the independent military status the Iraqi 
government granted to the PMF, have solidified political representation 
from organizations such as Katai’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) 
for the foreseeable future. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Iran has been expanding its influence globally by utilizing a large network of proxy 
organizations outside of its borders. These various proxy networks have been successful in 
implementing Iranian foreign policy while maintaining a distant relationship to the state. 
The use of proxy networks is not a new concept, yet Iran has had long-term success while 
other states within the region have had difficulties with proxy employment. How has Iran 
been successful in utilizing proxies as a key means of implementing foreign policy and 
promoting the state’s interests, and why have certain factions continued to side with Iran? 
These questions will be explored through a case study and descriptive analysis. This thesis 
will examine whether Iran’s effectiveness in utilizing proxies, specifically the Popular 
Mobilization Forces (PMF), is a sustainable foreign policy option, and if the future of Iran’s 
grand strategy through a proxy militia is a sustainable option to promote state interests. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States has an enduring regional interest in the Middle East. The most 
recent U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) highlights the focus to disrupt financing and 
discredit extremism that currently resides within the region.1 Therefore, it is important to 
examine what factors influence a state to utilize militant proxy clients, and the challenges 
they face with employing proxy clients to advance state interests outside of their borders. 
Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been successful in expanding its 
influence throughout the Middle East through a broad network of proxy organizations. 
However, even though proxy warfare is not a new term, security studies have tended not 
to focus on proxy war as this style of warfare has been conducted in the background of 
foreign diplomacy.2  
 
1 “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” The White House, March 3, 2021, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-
strategic-guidance/. 
2 Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare, War and Conflict in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2013), 2. 
2 
The dawn of the nuclear age resulted in states seeking out a different means for 
extending their political influence outside of their defined borders with a return on political 
gains and little risk of conflict. From the mid twentieth century onward, conventional state-
on-state warfare has diminished. This demise combined with the lingering conflicts of 
Afghanistan and Iraq have left a lasting impression on both American and European powers 
with their keenness to mobilize large forces against an “asymmetric enemy.”3 When 
looking at the various states that have relied on proxy clients as a tool of foreign policy or 
national security, their employment has become a hybrid threat that is nestled within other 
elements of a state’s political and security goals.4 
The utilization of this hybrid threat, incorporating unconventional tactics such as 
the targeting of terrorism and criminal networks, is now nestled within a conventional 
military strategy of a uniformed force.5 Are these methods sustainable as a state further 
develops, such as in the case of Iran? And what factors cause certain factions to support 
Iran’s interest from a far? 
Iran continues to face growing challenges to its own state security with international 
sanctions imposed and growing environmental concerns about water scarcity and resource 
mismanagement.6 This, combined with a growing civil unrest and economic decline, has 
stressed Iran’s ability to maintain its independence within the Middle East. Perhaps as a 
result, Iran has moved closer both politically and strategically with Russia and China, 
suggesting a shift in its anti-great power revolutionary ethos: “neither East nor West.”7 The 
assumption can be made that Iran will be included in U.S. security strategies for the 
foreseeable future and will be the primary adversary of Middle Eastern neighbors. The 
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 Michael A. Innes, ed., Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates & the Use of Force, 1st ed 
(Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2012), xiv. 
6 Ahmad Majidyar, “Growing Environmental Problems Strain Iran’s Ties with Its Neighbors,” Middle 
East Institute, July 5, 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/growing-environmental-problems-strain-
irans-ties-its-neighbors. 
7 Clement Therme, “Iran’s ‘Neither East Nor West’ Slogan Today,” Italian Institute for International 
Political Studies, February 8, 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/irans-neither-east-nor-west-
slogan-today-22234. 
3 
examination of the factors that allows Iran to utilize proxies as an instrument in foreign 
policy, promotion of states interest, and national security may provide answers on Iran’s 
strategic conduct in the future. 
C. DEFINITIONS 
The term “proxy war” has been defined in multiple contexts and can becoming 
confusing at time due to the ability to view a proxy war as a stand-alone conflict. In this 
thesis, proxy wars will follow the definition Mumford states is an “indirect engagement in 
conflict by third parties wishing to influence is strategic outcome.”8 This definition is 
relevant when discussing Iran as it defines proxy war as a component of modern war 
pursuing an outcome through a means that balances “interest, ideology, and risk.”9  
The term “client” will be utilized in describing actors that are associated with the 
“state.” When the term client is referenced, the relation to the state is associated with the 
definition deemed by Max Weber. A state is “a human community that claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”10 The 
clarification of the term state is imperative as a “client” has the ability to employ force at 
the direction of what it deems to be a legitimate governing body. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theories on the employment of proxies have not been studied as a standalone 
element within warfare until recently. As described by Andrew Mumford, security studies 
have not tended to focus solely on proxy war, as this style of warfare had been conducted 
in the background of foreign diplomacy during the Cold War.11 As studies progressed after 
the Cold War, there has been a rise in “collective proxy strategies,” a term used to describe 
either mutual support to one organization either by mutual corporations or informal 
 
8 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, I. 
9 Ibid., 2. 
10 Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford, 
California: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 7. 
11 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 2. 
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alliances.12 The involvement in achieving a common goal has shifted from the traditional 
view of collective security that involves traditional diplomacy to what is now an informal 
method of promoting a state’s interests through an informal collective providing support 
to proxies from afar.  
The literature concerning proxy employment can be divided into two main schools 
of thought, a state centric approach and a non-state centric approach. When analyzing a 
state centric view, Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander offer a candid definition of terrorism 
that includes the state which is defined as “the deliberate employment of violence or the 
threat of use of violence by sovereign states or sub national groups encouraged or assisted 
by sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law.”13 
On the contrary, to understand proxy operations, Idean Salehyan argues that a non-state-
centric view must be analyzed. His belief is that civil wars are non-isolated events due to 
direct association that both the government of a state and an opponent are tied to the much 
larger picture of conflicts between states.14 This literature review will look at both 
approaches to proxy employment, and further review what causes a client to support a state 
actor. 
1. State Centric Approach
Between 1970 and 1980, almost all the large-scale terrorist organizations had direct 
state backing. The most prevalent examples are Lebanese Hizballah supported by Iran, 
India’s backing of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and multiple Arab states supporting the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). According to Jeffrey Bale, the current theory on 
proxy utilization is based around personal biases that are politically influenced and can be 
linked back to state intelligence agencies.15 From the international relations camp, the 
12 Ibid., 103. 
13 Innes, Making Sense of Proxy Wars, 6. 
14 Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011), 165. 
15 Innes, Making Sense of Proxy Wars, 4. 
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main actors is a nation-state, where culture and politics merge as one.16 Due to this 
perspective taking on a strong view from a realist approach, this theory would focus on the 
direct actions of the state, but not that of the non-state actors.17 This left a gap in the 
comprehension of their “nature, ideologies, motivation and objectives,” a understanding 
that is needed in order to properly understand its “role” in international affairs.18 This state 
centric view draws upon the Cold War roots that believed the Soviet Union was behind 
terrorist activities taking place globally. 
A second theory that is proposed evolved from a leftist approach to the state centric 
view. It contradicts the thought that the Western governments are not the innocent targets 
of attacks by terrorists’ regimes or state sponsored proxies. Instead, Bale states that “right-
wing governments and papa-state apparatuses” that are backed by U.S. and the West are 
the main culprits of terrorism.19 This view highlights a state sponsor arming a proxy to 
promote its security interests within a region, and the U.S. is a case study according to 
Mumford. The U.S. has provided aid to Israel that has averaged $2 billion per year since 
1971, with two-thirds towards military assistance.20 This does not include an additional $2 
billion for the development of modern tanks and aircraft.21 The U.S. has not been directly 
involved in a conflict in which Israel has fought.22 However, the U.S. has used Israel as a 
proxy to reinforce its security interests within the region, and a means to prevent future 
conflicts in line with its own security agenda. The link between both schools of thought 
described is the nation-state, which causes a lack of review on the non-state actor. 
State sponsorship is seen present day in the theories defined by David Wurmser, a 
foreign policy analyst describing the war of terrorism is “an epic struggle between a whole 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Ibid., 3. 
18 Ibid., 5. 
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Clyde R Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Israel: U.S. 
Foreign Assistance, April 26, 2005, 4. 
21 Ibid., 3. 
22 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 40. 
6 
category of nations…the seven state sponsors of terror and us.”23 Bale uses this to describe 
the theory that if these state sponsors did not exist, then Islamist terrorism would not be a 
threat to the West. 
As with state sponsorship, Daniel Byman suggests there is a lack of comprehension 
as to what defines a sponsor of terrorism. He describes the process as political, which leads 
to a gap in actually understanding the effects of a state sponsor.24 This further is broken 
down in the terms “terrorism” and “state actor,” as both must be defined. Byman agrees 
that if all actions of a state are described as terrorism, then one can no longer clearly identify 
the link and further complicating any type of actionable solution.25  
When describing the range of support a state can provide, Byman expands the 
spectrum to include non-deliberate government action as seen in Thailand.26 Groups such 
as the Karen National Union in Myanmar, have set up bases in neighboring Thailand. This 
has placed Thailand in the spectrum of support described by Byman, as Thailand has 
neglected to secure its borders with Myanmar, allowing guerillas to have access to support 
from Karen refugee camps within Thailand’s borders.27 This has led to border disputes and 
diplomatic friction between both countries as cross border “hot pursuit” raids take place 
and further strain relations between both countries.28 
This range of support is seen in case studies in regions across the globe. In Sudan, 
Darfurese rebels carry out operations and have base camps in eastern Chad leading Sudan 
to openly accuse Chad of harboring rebels who share the same ethnicity within these 
regions.29 In the Middle East, Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants have enjoyed the haven of 
neighboring Pakistan, which has strained the relationship of the Afghanistan and Pakistani 
23 Innes, Making Sense of Proxy Wars, 10. 
24 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Ibid., 11. 
28 Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 3. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
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governments.30 However, a gap in these theories is that they fail to address the groups that 
have their own political agenda and agree to side with a state sponsor.31 
2. Non-State Centric Approach
To understand proxy operations, Idean Salehyan states that a non-state centric view 
must be analyzed as to counter future proxy threats, as an understanding of the organization 
and its desired outcome is needed. His belief is that civil wars are non-isolated events due 
to direct association that both the government of a state and an opponent are tied to the 
much larger picture of conflicts between states.32 He provides quantitative studies that 
armed conflict both in a state, and between states has a correlation to transnational 
involvement.33 Specifically, a weak state does not have the ability to maintain peace within 
their own borders and becomes susceptible to influence from outside actors.  
Iraq has experienced the trouble of maintaining peace within its own borders as 
seen with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and its ongoing conflict with the Turkish 
government. However, the PKK has reached out to disrupt Turkish interests abroad with 
support from as far away as Europe.34 The PKK is a non-state actor who has ties to land 
within the Iraqi state and has been allowed to operate freely. Turkey continues to conduct 
cross-border attacks on sovereign Iraqi soil without authorization, escalating tensions 
within the region.  
A new theory for viewing the use of proxies as described by Mumford is through 
the eyes of religion. The theory became relevant with Osama Bin-Laden’s Fatwa declaring 
Jihad against “Jews and Crusaders” in 1998.35 This view changes the concept of the 
relationship that a proxy is to a sponsor, as now the relationship it tied to a religious figure. 
30 Ibid., 5. 
31 Innes, Making Sense of Proxy Wars, 6. 
32 Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 165. 
33 Ibid., 166. 
34 Ibid., 1. 
35 Fred Halliday, Two Hours That Shook the World: September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences 
(London: Saqi, 2002), 217. 
8 
These proxy organizations are interpreted as “proxy clients of God,” and not of a state, in 
their actions of taking arms against those who threaten Islam.36 
 3. Why Do States Employ Proxy Clients?
When reviewing the general theories on proxy studies, the reasons why a state 
would employ a proxy client are further debated. These reasons are broken down into 
employment cost and deniability, low risk, and a lack of a nuclear deterrent. As described 
by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955 regarding the use of foreign assistance programs 
during the Cold War as a form of proxy, they are “the cheapest insurance in the world.”37 
A proxy client provides an option that is less costly than a modernized military, that 
includes reduced risk to the supporting state to achieve a desired end state. The funding of 
a proxy client can often cost less than the development and build-up of a conventional 
military force. The proxy client option allows for state support to come in both the form of 
overt and covert form. For example, Iran and Afghanistan have taken a public view and 
openly stated they support terrorist actions.38 For Iran, Hizballah has been operating 
against Israel and now receives hundreds of millions of dollars directly from Iran annually 
and is public with the support it receives from the state.39 This is often not the case though. 
As Mumford describes, the use of proxies enables an outcome when direct involvement 
risks the consequences imposed by “interest, ideology, and risk.”40 This empowers weaker 
states to overcome the reach of more powerful states that a conventional military response 
would not facilitate. 
After 1945 and the advancement in nuclear weapons, the desire for direct state on 
state conflict was lessoned with the risk of mutually assured destruction. Further, at the 
conclusion of World War I and World War II, major powers saw the consequences of a 
36 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 105. 
37 Ibid., 100. 
38 Byman, Deadly Connections, 10. 
39 Shannon W. Caudill, “Hizballah Rising: Iran’s Proxy Warriors” (National Defense University 
Institution for National Strategic Studies, January 2008), 128, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA516517. 
40 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 2. 
9 
state-on-state war with the gruesomely high death tolls that affected all social classes. This 
is seen currently between India and Pakistan and ongoing tensions which include sporadic 
kinetic actions. Pakistan has employed a robust network of proxy clients as part of its own 
approach to national security. This is nestled within its strategy for conventional military 
forces and a nuclear deterrent.41 Both states possess nuclear arms, and a nuclear response 
from either could kill more than five hundred thousand people with more than one million 
casualties from a 50-kiloton weapon over New Delhi or Islamabad.42 When a country lacks 
a nuclear capability as a deterrent, a proxy client can provide both an offensive and 
defensive capability that again is a cheaper cost than a conventional force, or can further 
offset a underdeveloped conventional military in achieving strategic goals.43 
Proxy groups and their actions are not restricted by defined state borders. 
Governments have difficulty defeating these types of organizations even when they have 
the upper hand on modern military equipment. Proxies can break defined state borders and 
operate outside of their opposers’ reach in regions that are unstable and provide protection. 
These regions further allow a group the ability to gain support from regional ethnic ties. 
This provides a proxy organization the upper hand as they now seek to avoid their 
opposition’s authority which is often defined by sovereign space with defined borders.44 
The ability to transcend borders allows the conduct of offensive operations in areas that a 
conventional, uniformed force cannot operate without severe consequences. As Kapur 
describes in his study of Pakistan, the use of militant proxies has allowed Pakistan to slowly 
drain India’s financial resources at a minimal cost to Pakistan. Further, Pakistan has used 
its proxies to support its states interests in challenging control of the Kashmir region, and 
in more recent times, Pakistan militant policy has been used to secure relations on its border 
41 S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the Pakistani 
State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 8. 
42 Ibid., 2. 
43 Afshon Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War,” Security Studies 28, 
no. 1 (January 2019): 7, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1508862. 
44 Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 7. 
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with Afghanistan by promoting the Taliban and promoting a friendly government on its 
Wester border.45 
4. Iran’s Iraqi Clients
When viewing why a Shiite movement or organization would continue to back Iran, 
or begin distancing themselves from them, Ostovar describes three conditions. These are 
that the client must share the Islamic Republics interpretation of Shi’a Islam, Iran is the 
main supporter of monetary and material support, and the client supports Iran’s political 
agenda not just locally to the client, but within the region.46 If these three ties are not met, 
the client is susceptible to finding the need to distance itself from Iran or seek support 
elsewhere. This thesis enhances on Ostovar’s theories by narrowing the scope to the Iraqi 
Shiite organizations under the umbrella of the PMF. Ostovar’s criteria will be applied to 
the Badr organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Katai’ib Hezbollah (KH) and their 
relationship to the Iranian state and current political movements.  
When analyzing Iran’s employment of proxy clients and the causes that stimulate 
an organization to side with Iran, both a state and non-state centric approach are relevant. 
Iran has overtly supported specific proxy clients since 1979 and has taken a hard stance in 
moving away from relations with foreign powers. However, a non-state centric approach 
is relevant in this thesis, specifically for analyzing why a certain Shiite faction would 
continue to support Iran. 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Why a state utilizes a proxy force, and what has allowed Iran to continue to utilize
proxies as a key tool in its foreign policy will be examined through a case study analysis. 
Further, the causes for certain factions to side with Iran as a state sponsor under an 
independent security institution to the Iraqi military will also be reviewed through a 
descriptive study as this will provide a metric for Iran’s future successes of retaining proxy 
45 Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 10. 
46 Afshon Ostovar, “Iran, Its Clients, and the Future of the Middle East: The Limits of Religion,” 
International Affairs 94, no. 6 (November 1, 2018): 1239, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy185. 
11 
clients. For this, the area of focus will be on the Iraqi Shiite factions of the PMF, and the 
causes that have driven Shiite political parties and populations to outsource the Iraqi 
security institution to an independent institution with ties to the Iranian state. 
1. First Argument
As Iran continues to strive for independence of foreign influence, the use of proxy 
clients will continue to be a cost effective and low risk option, especially in neighboring 
countries that border the state. Iran will continue to exert its influence through a network 
of proxy clients while maintaining and continuing to modernize its unformed military for 
defense of its borders.  
2. Second Argument
Iraq has experienced two influential events in recent history that have affected the 
Iraqi Shiite view on Iranian backing. The first was the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the 
second, the movement to expel ISIS from its borders. For influential Shiite leaders, the 
potential of integrating the PMF into the Iraqi military is seen as a means of walking back 
support to Iran, a move to take a non-sectarian approach to unify the state and integrate 
Iraq into regional affairs that will bring eventual stability and removal of U.S. intervention. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN
A case study review will be used to examine the means and outcomes of proxy
employment due to the availability of historical examples. Two general case studies will 
be included. In the review of each case study, the arguments regarding Iran’s future 
employment of a network of proxy clients will be compared to previous successes and 
failures within the study. 
In addition to the works depicted in the literature review, research will comprise of 
secondary works and primary source material. Examples of secondary works include 
professional journal articles, textbooks, and scholarly articles. Primary sources will include 
news reports, government websites, and speeches by regional leaders and religious figures. 
12 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW
This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the introduction
and definitions. The second dissects the PMF’s dominate Shiite organizations that are 
associated with Iran. Within this chapter, the Shiite organizations discussed will include 
the Badr Organization, AAH, and KH. The third is comprised of a case study review and 
comparison of Pakistan to Iran, and the similarities each state had with proxy employment. 
This chapter is dived into four sections, focusing on the conditions that allowed for proxies 
to flourish, the subversive approach, factors that hindered proxy employment, and the 
connection to Iran’s sustained proxy employment. The final chapter concludes with Iran’s 
ability to continue to retain and employ proxy clients. The implications of integrating the 
PMF under the Iraqi military or the disbandment of the umbrella organization, and the 
effects this decision will have on the future of Iraq and U.S. Middle East involvement are 
discussed. 
13 
II. IRAN’S INFLUENCE IN IRAQ 
When the U.S. entered Iraq in 2003, Iran seized the opportunity to advance its 
strategic objectives in the war-torn country.47 The void left by the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein allowed for pre-existing armed Shia organizations to operate with little 
impediment during this period. Iran sent military aid, troops, and advisors to support Iraq 
in the defeat of Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) through pre-existing Shia 
organizations which compose a portion of the clients operating under the umbrella of the 
Popular Mobilization Force (PMF). With Iraq granting formal recognition of the PMF in 
November 2016 as an umbrella group of the official state military force, Iran gained a 
strategic foothold in Iraq through these Iranian backed clients of the PMF. 48 This placed 
Iran in a power position to influence and have a direct voice in Iraqi government decisions.  
The use of proxy militias, or clients, is not a new concept within the Iraqi state 
construct. Iraqi political leaders have had a history of employing their own loyalist militias 
to support their political agenda, and this history can provide context to the rise of such 
umbrella organizations as the Popular Mobilization Forces.49 Cases involving loyalist 
militias have been seen dating back to Iraq-Iran War in which Jaysh al-Sha’abi were 
employed and later, groups such as Jaysh al-Quds and Fedayin Saddam were heavily 
involved in both the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and later during the United States and coalition 
forces combat operations of 2003.50 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has been the main controller of 
Iran’s proxy clients in carrying out the militant actions associated with Iran’s foreign policy 
and interests outside of its state borders. In Iraq, the fall of Mosul by ISIS provided a means 
forward in Iran’s promotion of state’s interests through its use of proxy clients as a part of 
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its "grand strategy and national security” as described by Afshon Ostovar.51 The void left 
by the failures of Iraq’s government and military against ISIS provided a means for the 
increase in armed movements within Iraq’s Shiite population, especially post 2014 when 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued a fatwa calling for “armed resistance” against ISIS.52 
A. POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES 
Iran has capitalized on the development of proxy clients with strong ties to the local 
political structure. The is displayed with the construct of the PMF acting as an umbrella for 
multiple proxy organizations in which many have pledged their allegiance and support to 
Iran’s theocratic government and version of Islam. The method of utilizing a proxy client 
to directly influence a state’s political apparatus is described by Ostovar as part of Iran’s 
use of proxy clients within its grand strategy as a means of promoting Iran’s own state 
interests.53 The rise of the PMF in 2014 and its establishment as an umbrella organization 
that included Iranian backed clients is reflected by this practice. The PMF quickly achieved 
legitimacy in Iraq by further uniting the multiple Shiite militias across the state with the 
threat of ISIS. 
In June 2014, Nouri al‑Maliki the Iraqi Prime Minister endorsed the creation of the 
PMF even though the Iraqi constitution does not allow the creation of “militia entities” that 
are not a part of the armed forces.54 The non-traditional creation of the PMF and the 
nationwide support it received with its creation would not have been possible if it were not 
for the religious endorsement from Ayatollah Ali Sistani.55 
Sistani’s “Wajib al-Kifai” fatwa was unique as it was directed at all Iraqi citizens, 
not just a particular sect or religion to join the Iraqi security forces. This included Christian 
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and Sunni members, further contributing to the image of inclusivity in the subsequent 
formation of the PMF. However, due to the state of disarray of the uniformed military, 
Sistani’s call to arms increased the numbers of new recruits primarily for the non-state 
militias that would go on to become a part of the PMF instead of volunteers for Iraq’s 
beleaguered security forces.56  
In November 2016, Iraq granted formal recognition to the PMF through the Hashd 
Law. Hashd Law legally integrated the PMF into the Iraqi security forces construct as a 
“multi-layered paramilitary body.”57 However, the PMF still retained the title of an 
“independent” element within the Iraqi Security Forces.58 This allowed the Iranian backed 
factions within the PMF to operate under the identity of both a state or a non-state actors 
depending on the optic required to support the current political and strategic objectives.59 
If the PMF were to lose the independent label, the construct would become disbanded with 
the integration into traditional Iraqi Security force units. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) 
spokesman Naeem al-Aboudi publicly stated that this type of integration would dissolve 
current groups such as AAH within the umbrella of the PMF.60 
Iran utilized the PMF independent structure to send military aid, troops, and 
advisors to support Iraq in the defeat of ISIS.61 Adil Abdul Mahdi, the Prime Minister of 
Iraq made a decree in July of 2019 that formally set the precedence of the PMF assimilating 
into the Iraqi security forces.62 The PMF, since its assimilation into the Iraqi military 
forces, has been attempting to shed the image of being associated with the term “militia” 
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under the Iraq military, instead focusing on an optic that the PMF is now a “state-sanctioned 
security institution.”63 
From an institutional standpoint, Iraq is utilizing Iranian backed paramilitary forces 
to coup proof current standing authorities and protect its status as a state. Coup proofing is 
seen with Iraqi political figures often creating their own militias of loyal followers to 
protect their interest and could be viewed as setting the precedence for the PMF and the 
argument that Iraq has now begun to outsource its own security institution.64 This is 
described by Rudolf as taking a “battlefield authority” and transitioning it into “post-war 
institutional leverage.”65 However, the PMF is unique to the Middle East in its early stages 
as it held a position of power as a security institution. The PMF is unlike other 
organizations such as Hezbollah and the IRGC operating within the region. The PMF does 
not have physical “control” of Iraq as Hezbollah does with portions of Lebanon, nor does 
the PMF serve as the primary military element for Iraq as seen with the IRGC serving as 
Iran’s primary state’s defense force.66 
1. Badr Organization
Operating as a de facto arm of Iran since 1980, Badr has publicly pledged its support 
to Qassim Soleimani and its operational agenda has been openly controlled by the IRGC.67 
Labeled as the oldest Iranian proxy in Iraq, Badr has been operating as the militant arm for 
the largest Shiite political party in Iraq, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in 
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Iraq (SCIRI). 68 The Badr organization can be described as the most powerful organization 
under the umbrella of the PMF with an estimated strength of over 20,000 fighters.69 
Badr has remained devoted to both Iran’s theocratic system and Supreme Leader, 
to include supporting the “regional strategic goals” of Iran within the Middle East.70 
Further, as Badr shares the same religious belief as Iran, it has solidified their 
synchronization with Iran on “domestic and regional agendas.”71  
Badr has taken on the Iranian theocratic Islamic system as the “religio-political 
ideology” of the Badr organization with their allegiance to the Iranian Supreme Leader.72 
Badr’s embracement of this interpretation of Shi’a Islam in that any action against the 
Iranian Supreme Leader is a “sin” sets the foundation for a relationship that takes priority 
over Iraqi state political alliances.73 
For Badr, the SCIRI relationship with the Iraqi Shiite population appealed to the 
United States government to such an extent that monetary support was offered in 1998. 
However, Badr declined due to the United States foreign policy moves of “isolating Iran 
and Iraq.”74 Badr receives its primary financial backing solely from Iran. More 
importantly, there are no other viable options for financial stability with the regional and 
global influence that Iran possesses.75 
When the United States called for the disarmament of the Badr organization, Badr 
successfully reimaged itself as the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development 
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to avoid intervention and appear non-militant 2003.76 Due to the weakened state of the 
Iraqi security forces at this time, Badr has been cited with 16,000 of its members joining 
the uniformed Iraqi Security forces between 2003-2005.77  
In 2007, Badr further solidified its relationship with Iran. The SCIRI attempted to 
reimage itself as a non-Iranian backed organization that no longer aligned itself with 
Tehran by changing its name to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).78 In a move 
to maintain its relationship and preserve its loyalty to Iran, Badr dislodged itself from the 
ISCI and became both a political and military organization.79 As the new Badr 
Organization, the group focused on achieving a strong political footprint within Iraq along 
with expanding Shiite power.80 Hadi al-Amiri, the leader and secretary general of the Badr 
Organization called Ali Khamenei “the leader not only for Iranians, but the Islamic 
nation.”81 
It has been argued that the Badr Organization ascended into political positions such 
as those in the Ministry of Interior in 2014 and holding 22 seats in parliament during the 
same period due to Badr’s collaboration with coalition forces after the fall of Saddam.82 
This collaboration during the early 2000’s was not seen with other Shiite factions such as 
Sadr’s Mahdi Army.83  
The Badr organization enjoyed a series of victories fighting against ISIS starting in 
2014 with notable victories flighting side by side with Iraqi security forces in Mosul and 
Fallujah.84 During the battle of Tikrit in 2015, Reuters reported that both Badr fighters and 
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the Iraq Army utilized the same model tanks with the logo on the side serving as the only 
difference between forces.85 
 2. Asa’ib Ahl ah-Haq: League of the Righteous
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) was seen originally as a member of the Mahdi Army 
prior to 2006. As an Iranian backed militant group under the PMF, AAH has moved into 
the political realm of Iraqi politics with its membership into the Fatah coalition. 86 Prior to 
AAH splitting from the Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi forces, the followers under Qais al-
Khazali began attacking United States and coalition forces even after Sadr gave the order 
to cease offensive operations.87 These events led to the IRGC recruiting Khazali in 2006 
under Qassim Soleimani, and the rise to what is now known as the present day AAH who 
receives its financial and logistical support openly from Iran.88 As a member of the PMF 
since 2014, AAH has now enjoyed funding from both Iraq and Iran.89 
With the rise of ISIS, AAH has imaged itself as a nationalist political actor and has 
used the Sistani’s call to arms as a means to “re-legitimize its armed resistance.”90 The 
fight with ISIS has put AAH in a unique situation as the group claimed over 6,000 attacks 
against United States and coalition force between 2006 and 2011, and has now put AAH 
on the same side as their enemies enemy.91 Even as such, AAH’s anti-American rhetoric 
has not changed. AAH under Khazali was responsible for the 2007 Karbala attack in which 
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five American soldiers were killed, to include four who were captured and executed.92 It 
is argued that the AHH raid was carried out by the direction of the IRGC.93 
Following the Karbala attack, Khazali was captured by United States forces but was 
released in a prisoner exchange in December 2009. During Khazali’s detainment, many 
AAH members fled to Iran and during this time received training and support from 
IRGC.94 
With the American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, AAH began to reimage itself as 
not an “anti-Western Islamist Militia,” but a nationalist political party with an agenda to 
maintain a Shiite run Iraqi government and increase Iranian influence within Iraq.95 In 
2015, a spokesman for AAH announced that AAH is “willing to accept a U.S. military 
presence in Iraq, under the supervision of the Iraqi government.”96 However, in 2016 along 
with Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), AAH has called upon the Iraqi parliament to implement an 
immediate withdrawal of United States and coalition forces, threatening a military uprising 
and action against coalition forces if not.97 
Created in 2018, AAH was one of eight groups that formed the Fatah Alliance who 
all had ties to Iran for monetary and logistical support in funding their militant 
operations.98 AAH won 15 of the 48 seats held by the Fatah Alliance in parliament, the 
largest of the eight members. Iran’s direct backing of groups such as AAH in Fatah has 
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furthered Iranian national security goals as seen in the parliamentary vote of 170–0 to expel 
U.S. forces from Iraq in January 2020.99  
3. Katai’ib Hezbollah
Originally established in 2003 serving as an umbrella for multiple Iraqi Shiite 
militant groups, KH has had direct ties to Iran since its inception due to the linage of KH’s 
founder. KH was founded and led by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and later led by Ahman al-
Hamidawi after Muhandis was killed in a U.S. drone strike. The drone strike which took 
place in January of 2020, targeted, and killed IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani, in 
which Muhandis was also present resulting in his death.100 KH members swear an oath of 
loyalty to Ayatollah Khamenei, which includes accepting Khamenei as their own spiritual 
leader.101 
Muhandis has identified as an Iraqi nationalist who seeks to unify the countries 
“ethno-sectarian identities” under a government whose system is inclusive of all.102 Prior 
to his death, Muhandis served as the deputy to Qassem Soleimani for Iraqi operations, the 
Iraqi deputy national security advisor, and the operational leader of the PMF.103 Prior to 
the creation of KH, Muhandis has had early roots to Iran with the Iran-Iraq war fleeing Iraq 
to fight for Iran in the 1980s. Dating back to 1984, Muhandis played a direct role in vetting 
and recruiting Iraqi Shiite volunteers to form what was the first Badr battalion composed 
of Iraqi Mujahideen Forces and Iraqi Shiite prisoners of war.104 The membership of 
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Muhandis within the creation of Badr led to his direct relationship with both the Iran backed 
Hezbollah operating in Lebanon and IRGC.105 
With the establishment of KH by Muhandis, he utilized these relationships with 
Iran to establish a network of smuggling routes to receive weapons and logistical aid 
directly from Iran that are still employed today.106 The lethality of KH was on display 
between 2003 and 2011 with the U.S. and coalition military involvement in Iraq. Ali 
Khendery, the U.S. ambassador for Iraq stated that KH was responsible for “some of the 
most lethal attacks against U.S. and coalition forces.”107 During this period, KH abstained 
from direct targeting of the Iraqi government and forces. However, KH refused Iraqi 
government requests to disband after the coalition withdrawal stating the instability of Iraq 
did not allow this.108 
With the withdrawal of coalition forces post 2011, KH began focusing its efforts 
on supporting the Assad regime in Syria at the direction of Soleimani along with countering 
the rise of ISIS in Iraq.109 This event supports the growth of Iranian influence to promote 
its own political and security agenda within the region through non-state actors. Even 
though there is confirmation that KH has sent fighters to Syria, Muhandis has publicly 
countered such actions and stated that these individuals are volunteers and are doing so 
under their own accord, removing the PMF, KH, and Iran from accountability.110 
With KH officially becoming a part of the PMF in 2014, Muhandis utilized his 
influence to expand upon KH within the umbrella of the organization. Muhandis 
successfully used KH’s growing influence by becoming the “de facto” leader of the PMF. 
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KH was a key player with the retaking of key areas captured by Iraq, to include Samarra, 
Tikrit, Fallujah, and Mosul.111 
As an independent element to the Iraqi security construct, KH has been able to 
openly defy orders and government officials when actions would go against their stance on 
U.S. involvement to retake ISIS controlled territory. In an act that is not observed by Iraqi 
army or Federal Police units in the fight against ISIS, Kataib Hezbollah has openly 
disobeyed orders from the Iraqi prime minister. This has included KH spokesman Jafar al-
Husseini threatening against any participation by U.S. aircraft in the 2015 battle of Tikrit. 
Husseini stated that KH possesses “the capabilities to shoot them down” when the Iraqi 
PM requested U.S. air support assistance to break a deadlock in the fighting.112  
As the second strongest member of the Fatah party behind AAH, KH can sway the 
Iraqi government and export the Islamic ideals of Iran. KH has continued to defy decrees 
from the Iraqi government to disband and lay down its arms, with KH stating to the media 
“it will never give up its weapons.”113 Further, according to a spokesman for KH in 
December 2019, “kicking the Americans out of Iraq remains the key demand and 
parliament must approve a law in this regard.”114 
B. SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 
Unique to Iran that is not apparent in other states or studies of state-proxy client 
relationships is the fact that many of Iran’s proxy clients share both a religious and 
ideological identity. This is described by Ostovar in Iraq with clients following the Twelver 
Shiite religion that composes the majority of the state of Iran, and further adopting the 
ideological devotion viewing Iran’s supreme leader as the “ultimate religio-political 
authority.”115 While Iran prefers groups that align with the theocratic interpretation of 
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Shi’a Islam, this preference has not prevented Iran from supporting Sunni factions that 
have overlapping domestic interests. Ostovar highlights Iran has seen broader success in 
retaining long term loyalty of its clients when the client aligns with Iran’s religious 
practices, Iran is the primary supplier of material goods, and domestic and regional goals 
align with Iranian interests.116 
The Iranian Shiite backed organization called the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), eventually renamed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI) was a Shia Iraqi organization that fought against Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War 
through its military wing, the Badr Brigade, which was trained and armed by the IRGC.117 
Iran utilized SCIRI to lay a foundation for its future involvement and direct influence of 
Iraqi Shia political parties and the development of militant groups that were able to carry 
out actions to achieve political influence over its Iraqi neighbor.118 According to Mumford, 
SCIRI’s militant actions were a means for Iran to affect the current conflict in Iraq and the 
presence of U.S. forces, without becoming overtly involved.119 Badr continued to serve 
under the IRGC and remained as a militant arm and eventually separated from SCIRI to 
form its own political organization after the fall of Saddam Hussein.  
Upon the fall of Saddam Hussein, SCIRI changed its name to the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI) and began to distance itself from its former Iranian ally. The removal 
of the term “revolution” in 2007 by the ISCI signifies the move to support Iraq’s new order, 
and no longer supporting Iran’s Islamic revolution.120 The move of aligning with Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani as the senior cleric further diluted the political and ideological 
linkages between the party and Iran.121 The deliberate distancing of the SCIRI from Iran 
can be explained by Salehyan’s theory that actions taken between proxies and regional 
neighbors are not independent of each other, and the SCIRI actions of non-compliance 
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signaled a loss of influence from Iran with the organizations movement away from armed 
Islamic revolution.122 The separation signaled that the SCIRI is no longer a revolutionary 
arm of Iran, but instead, emphasizes the SCIRI desire to showcase its legitimacy as a Iraqi 
political party.  
Ostovar describes how the Iraqi Shi’a political groups returning from Iran had 
difficulties not siding with the U.S. involvement of the time, and their ability to reach the 
Shi’a population further resulted in this move away from Iran.123 Ammar al-Hakim, the 
Supreme Council’s leader continued to distance his political project from Iran, when in 
2017 he split from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq completely and formed a new, 
nominally secular political party called the National Wisdom Party.124 The party’s 
platform clashed with Iranian views as it was based on “non-Islamist, non-sectarian 
political ideals” that are in stark contrast with political Islam from Iran.125 
C. CONCLUSION  
The evidence presented with the current breakdown of the PMF will present many 
long-term challenges. As an Iraqi “independent” security institution, the PMF incorporates 
multiple organizations that do not necessarily have an allegiance to the Iraqi state. The 
observations on the origins, allegiances, and leadership of the PMF provides context in 
understanding Iran’s future goals of broadening its national security agenda by utilizing its 
influence established through this parallel institution to the state. 
The argument is proposed that the origins of the PMF’s leadership and foundation 
for a trans-national relationship with a state sponsor are directly correlated to the long-term 
allegiances established with Iran prior to the Iran-Iraq War. The hybrid threat that the PMF 
presents, described by Innes as incorporating unconventional tactics within a uniformed 
force has been sustainable and flourished to date.126 However, with the rise of nationalistic 
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ideals amongst the Iraqi Shiite population and leadership of the PMF, the influence that 
Iran poses may become contested. This leads to the challenges associated with Iraq sticking 
with the current organizational construct of the PMF, and the dangers associated with an 
independent organization that has a competing agenda to the state government. 
In a statement made by Sistani on the security status of Iraq, Sistani stated “the 
victory over Daesh doesn’t mean the end of the battle with terrorism.”127 This choice of 
words by Sistani implies the Iraqi army still requires the assistance of the PMF for the 
foreseeable future. Further, Sistani would not risk a hostile response to Iraqi Shiites and 
clergy if a move were made to dissolve the PMF units.128 The lack of stability with the 
current security situation of the Iraqi state forecasts the decision point on whether to 
integrate the PMF into the Iraqi Security forces construct or allow the PMF to remain an 
independent affiliation is volatile. 
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III. PAKISTAN CASE STUDY 
The examination of Pakistan and its use as a case study in its comparison to Iran 
will show that there is a similarity in their use of proxy militias as part of a national strategy 
in achievement of a strategic outcome while avoiding direct military action. To better 
understand Iran’s future strategic conduct, analyzing a state with a similar proxy 
employment is beneficial. As Iran currently does not possess a nuclear deterrent, the same 
can be said about Pakistan prior to its nuclear program in the 1980s and the necessity of its 
use of proxy clients for security and as an approach to its national security goals. Pakistan’s 
proxy clients support the national strategy by countering regional rivals who possess 
conventional military forces of similar or greater strength, without the inherent risk of a 
conventional military conflict. 
A. CONDITIONS FOR PROXIES TO FLOURISH WITHIN THE STATE 
When looking at the various states that have relied on proxy clients as a tool of 
foreign policy or national security, their employment has become a hybrid threat that is 
nestled within other elements of a state’s political and security goals.129 This use of proxy 
clients is further complicated with states such as Pakistan and what actions by the state are 
categorized as “terrorism” and what are actions of a “state actor.” As Byman states, one 
cannot describe all actions of the state as terrorism as it would make it difficult to 
understand the state’s motives behind its actions.130 Pakistan has capitalized on “cost, 
operational and bargaining” benefits from employing a strategy that incorporates proxy 
clients using Islamic militants, similar to what is seen in Iran to achieve its national security 
goals.131 
The appeal of a proxy war over other conventional means of fighting a conflict is 
rooted within the level of risk that Pakistan is willing to take with direct involvement, 
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particularly the cost that affects the state “politically, financially, or materially.”132 The 
cost is a driving factor in policy decisions and the low cost of proxy clients off-set a weaker 
and undermanned uniformed force. As Kupar highlights, cost is a difficult metric to 
evaluate as states do not normally disclose financial dealings in total amounts spent in 
support of militant organizations.133 However, this recurring benefit is seen in states that 
have employed proxy clients such as Pakistan has done. Proxies are relatively cheap and 
have a minimum overhead in operations, arms, training, and recruitment when compared 
to a conventional military force.134 For example, Pakistan’s defense budget was a 
reportedly $7.8 billion in 2019.135 Pakistan’s most notable and reliable militant proxy, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, is believed to have an annual operating budget of $50 million and enjoys 
a steady income from other sources outside the state of Pakistan in forms of donations and 
revenue from legitimate businesses.136 With this figure, even if Pakistan were to fund the 
entire Lashkar-e-Taiba budget, a $50 million investment only constitutes .65% of 
Pakistan’s current defense budget. 
An example is Pakistan’s successful use of proxies in the opening days of the first 
two Kashmir Wars prior to the involvement of its conventional military.137 This effective 
use of proxies was evident in the successes of the Pakistani backed militants in Kashmir. 
As described by Kapur and Ganguly, the successful proxy use highlighted two critical 
findings. The first critical finding was the realization that a militant group could provide 
the means to counter India without Pakistan committing its conventional forces and the 
liability associated with a military blunder.138 The second was that Pakistan realized that 
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even though the conflict officially reached a cease fire in Kashmir, militant groups could 
continue to operate against India within Kashmir to further national strategic goals.139 
Pakistan was successfully able to confront India during the first Kashmir war that ended in 
a cease-fire in 1949. This led Pakistan to realize the benefits of minimum conventional 
military involvement and the benefits of utilizing militants. To Pakistan, this was the most 
sensible way to regain territory that was lost to India in Kashmir.140 
Another cost benefit of utilizing militant groups is the return that Pakistan receives 
with the ability of these groups to operate where conventional forces cannot, or where 
losses to a conventional military would be unacceptable. This benefit can be observed with 
Pakistani clients’ ability to operate almost unimpeded and navigate India’s federal forces 
and emplaced physical barriers. The clients’ freedom of movement has been an on-going 
challenge for India. Further, India’s international criticism for its “heavy handed” response 
within Kashmir, combined with its difficulty countering them has propped up these groups 
with an image of legitimacy.141 
An analysis of the 1971 Bangladesh war revealed that Pakistan relied mainly on its 
conventional military force which resulted in 95,000 Pakistani prisoners.142 The effect of 
this costly Pakistani defeat may still be seen in Pakistan’s desire to employ militant forces 
over its conventional military with successes that have been seen within the Kashmir 
region. The cost of the Bangladesh war on Pakistan’s conventional forces will continue to 
resonate with Pakistani planners in future strategic planning. This costly defeat strengthens 
Pakistan’s reliance on militant groups for its security strategy.  
Another factor that has appealed to the use of proxy clients is the social issues 
within Pakistan’s conventional military force that have stunted the professional 
development of its officer corps. Within the uniformed military, religion has become a 
contributing factor for officer promotions and career advancement. Officers that were 
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lacking in a religious foundation based in Islam were not competitive for advancement as 
Islamic teachings were included in promotion exams.143 Domestic policies that focused 
on Pakistani “state building” through a dependency on religious factors have hindered the 
growth of a professional uniformed military which further drives Pakistan’s reliance on 
proxy militants.144 
B. SUBVERSIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT  
Pakistan has taken a subversive approach in dealing with India to destabilize and 
oppose its influence within the region. Frederic Pearson’s six reasons for state involvement 
can be applied to why a state such as Pakistan would engage a state sponsored client: 
territorial acquisition, protection of social groups, protection of economic interests, 
protection of diplomatic or military interest, ideology, and regional power balance.145  
Ultimately, Pakistan is financially, militarily, and economically weaker than India. 
However, Pakistan’s strategic use of militants over the years has been costly to India by 
eroding the state both from an economic and material standpoint. Kupar’s theory of a 
“punishment base response” is seen in Pakistan’s militant use. Pakistan does not perceive 
sustaining a conventional conflict with India as a realistic means to achieving its national 
security goals. Instead, by using proxy clients it can slowly inflict a detrimental cost on 
India by targeting assets from within the Kashmir region.146 
Between 1988 to 2010, Pakistan’s slow attrition in Kashmir cost India roughly 
6,000 deaths within its security forces’ ranks. This cost is higher than the combined death 
total of both the first and second Kashmir wars for India. Further, India’s constant 
employment of security forces in Kashmir to counter Pakistani militants has taken a toll 
economically for India. The continual deployment of security forces in Kashmir has 
directed much needed funds from other sectors and has drawn harsh criticism from the 
international community with India’s use of kidnapping and torture to counter the militant 
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occupation of Kashmir.147 Further, these militant groups give Pakistan an option to 
denounce any action that may draw it closer into a conventional conflict with India.  
On the border with Afghanistan, Pakistan has taken a similar approach to border 
security and has utilized this region as a part of its larger state strategic strategy to counter 
India’s move to regional dominance. With conflict in Afghanistan comes opportunity, and 
Pakistan indirectly utilized funding received from the United States to fund militant 
operations within Kashmir. The United States provided materialistic support to the 
Mujahideen in Afghanistan to counter the Soviet Union directly through Pakistan, which 
allowed Pakistan to stockpile resources and divert efforts to Kashmir in support of its on-
going strategic goal of countering India through militant proxies.148 
When the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Afghanistan quickly 
became plagued with an internal civil war. Pakistan sought out a “stabilizing force” within 
Afghanistan, which drove Pakistani support for the Taliban’s rise to power.149 Pakistan 
used the Taliban to stabilize its northwest border with Afghanistan. The support to the 
Taliban is viewed as part of Pakistan’s national security goal of achieving “strategic depth” 
within Afghanistan to prevent cross border support to the Baloch and Sandhi movements 
to support India’s regional reach into Pakistan.150 Pakistan’s use of the Taliban to secure 
its border is comparable to the promotion of its strategic goal of “formalizing” the eastern 
border between India and limiting its reach in the region.151 Pakistan’s relationship with 
the Taliban was seen directly after 9/11 as Pakistan’s president General Pervez Musharraf 
allowed key Taliban officials to be relocated from Afghanistan to Pakistan.152 
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With the entrance of the United States into Afghanistan, Pakistan became crucial 
to the United States operations within the theater due to its physical location. Afghanistan 
is a landlocked country, and Pakistan’s Port of Karachi was a critical access point to the 
overland supply lines into Afghanistan. Further, the United States saw the border region 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a threat due to the sanctuary for Taliban operations 
which strained United States and Pakistan relations.153 This relationship was further 
stymied when the United States under President Obama began UAV strikes within the 
Pakistani border region.154 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s first Governor-General, 
possibly forecasted Pakistani mindset regarding international assistance and its security 
goals from the early days of its independence. The phrase “America needs Pakistan more 
than Pakistan needs America,” could explain Pakistan’s capitalization on what could be 
viewed as the United States’ narrow scope and short-term solutions within the region 
driving Pakistan to continue to see the benefits of a proxy militant strategy.155 
C. FACTORS THAT HINDERED PROXY EMPLOYMENT 
Contemporary scholars view the current approach of utilizing militants in support 
of Pakistan’s national security goals as a short-term strategy that will have long-term 
consequences.156 A theory proposed by Benowitz and Ceccanese is that providing military 
assistance may extend a regional conflict, or more specifically to Pakistan, provide 
increased risk of domestic instability due to the liability of its militant clients’ actions.157 
The increased risk is due to the inability of Pakistan to control its militant clients that it 
provides arms and logistical support to, thereby extending the duration of internal conflicts 
within its state borders and further diverting funds away from other sectors that could 
stimulate economic development for the state.  
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Militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have no social 
ties to the Kashmir region, which allows them to operate violently and often with a heavy-
handed response on the regional population. Both groups have demonstrated this heavy-
handed response with instances where they have violently targeted Muslims who do not 
abide by conservative Islamic followings.158 After years of steady funding from Pakistan, 
the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed now possess the strength and ability to carry 
out and enforce their own “agenda” and have moved to become self-sufficient from 
Pakistan as their primary supporter.159 
Militants that can be traced back to Pakistan are no strangers to high profile terrorist 
incidents which have continued to strain Pakistan’s international relations. These militants 
were involved in the attacks against the United States on 9/11, the 2005 London subway 
bombing, and on-going attacks within Afghanistan against the standing government.160 A 
proxy may support securities in achieving a strategic strategy but can become exhausting 
and draining and move to be more of a burden for the state. Although the militants Pakistan 
has employed are either Pakistani nationals or individuals that are tied to the state, this does 
not mean that they identify with the “state interests” of the Pakistani government and can 
quickly become a liability.161 
Another factor involves dependency. When a client is supported by a state, they 
become less dependent on the local population in which they live amongst for support.162 
This loss of dependency can have a negative effect on the population and the client can 
become more violent and forceful in acquiring needed resources. This is further tied to 
criminal acts as a client may attempt to expand its funding through black market trade. As 
these criminal networks expand, the difficulty of maintaining control of a client is increased 
especially after the conclusion of a conflict.163  
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Pakistan has been deemed as a state who harbors terrorists by key international 
backers, specifically the United States.164 Unlike Iran, who has taken a stark isolationist 
approach to regional politics and foreign support, Pakistan still relies on foreign support 
for critical areas and internal stability. The United States has had diplomatic relations with 
the state since its formation in 1947 and is the key contributor of foreign assistance to 
Pakistan through grant-based assistance, providing over $5 billion in civilian assistance 
and over $1 billion for emergency humanitarian response since 2009 alone.165 The United 
States sees Pakistan as playing a “constructive role in the region” and acknowledging that 
it will continue to support the state for the foreseeable future.166 However, the United 
States recently suspended security assistance in 2018 until Pakistan takes a “decisive and 
irreversible action” against terrorists identified by the United Nations who operate within 
the state.167 The extended history of not just backing militants as part of Pakistan’s security 
strategy, but not countering militant groups as they carry out actions outside of the state’s 
borders has now threated Pakistan’s funding from its largest source of foreign investment 
and export market.  
Pakistan has yet to close training locations for Kashmiri militants or severed its 
connection with the Afghan Taliban.168 This relationship has the potential to negatively 
affect Pakistan who receives foreign security assistance within the region. In June of 2020, 
the United States State Department sent notification to Congress of a potential military 
arms sale to India valued at 180 million.169 This sale would include Stinger missiles, which 
could ironically counter Pakistani F-16s which were purchased from the United States.170 
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D. CONNECTIONS TO IRAN’S SUSTAINED PROXY EMPLOYMENT 
The similarities between Iran and Pakistan of utilizing proxy militants as part of a 
national strategy are similar with avoiding a direct conventional regional conflict. Both 
states have taken on a “oppositional approach” to state building.171 As evidenced in 
Pakistan, it has focused on targeting the “status quo” of the region, specifically India when 
possible.172 The use of proxy clients is nestled within its strategy of achieving influence 
outside of Pakistan’s defined state boundaries, especially with its ability to counter India 
who possesses a larger and more modern conventional army.  
Iran has taken a similar approach to regional instability and has targeted the United 
States and its regional allies, including Israel whenever possible. Just as Pakistan has seen 
success in achieving state interests in the Kashmir border region and Afghanistan through 
militant groups, Iran has seen great success with its own approach to its militant strategy 
in neighboring Iraq.  
When analyzing Iran’s future conduct within the region, Pakistan serves as a case 
study postulating what may possibly happen with Iran’s future intent to acquire a nuclear 
capability and incorporate it into its national security goals. Iran does not possess a nuclear 
capability to date and the reliance on its proxy clients as a critical piece to its security 
strategy may provide a greater return than currently seen within Pakistan and the domestic 
instability and liability it faces.173 
Iran’s move to acquire a nuclear weapon could spark a Middle Eastern arms race 
that could be compared to what was seen between Pakistan and India beginning in 1998.174 
Currently, Israel and Pakistan are the only states in the broader Middle East region to 
possess a nuclear capability.175 If Iran were to acquire a nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia 
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would likely move to follow as remarks have already been made by key figures within the 
Kingdom.176 Further, it has been acknowledged that Saudi Arabia may fear the United 
States will not provide security for the region.177 This may further drive Saudi Arabia, and 
perhaps other states, such as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey, to evaluate and 
seek out a nuclear option to counter a nuclear capable Iran.178  
 Even with India and Pakistan acquiring a nuclear deterrent, kinetic conflicts have 
still taken place in both states with the conduct of limited military attacks. However, neither 
side has been willing to initiate a campaign that includes large scale attacks or provocative 
operations that may push a state to employ a nuclear response.179 As proposed by Batcher, 
a nuclear war is even more catastrophic within the Middle Eastern region that other areas. 
This thinking was based on an assessment from the unclassified Fallout Assessment 
System/Civilian Vulnerability Indicator Code (FAS/CIVIC), a scientific program produced 
to predict fallout and radioactive damage post nuclear conflict. The devastating effect on 
the Middle Easter region is due to the high density of populations at city centers, 
infrastructure that cannot withstand a blast, limited medical services and first responders 
to counter the incident along with the slow economic recovery that would follow.180 
If Iran were to acquire a nuclear capability in the future, the proposed statement 
that armed conflicts from its militant proxies would continue can be argued. This is due to 
Glenn Snyder’s Stability-Instability Paradox that two nuclear powers can still “skirmish at 
a lower level” without the apprehension of nuclear conflict.181 This theory could also prove 
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that Iran may increase its regional influence through proxy clients due to regional neighbors 
fearing that a heavy-handed response could spark a nuclear retaliation option from Iran.182 
E. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan’s use of proxy clients as a strategy to achieve influence outside of its 
borders has been rooted within Pakistani history. To date, Pakistan has constantly 
challenged India using proxy clients while successfully avoiding the consequences that an 
Indo-Pakistani conflict would entail.  
The argument has been made that Pakistan’s prolonged use of a proxy strategy has 
been beneficial to the state and its rivalry with India but may now show signs of 
transitioning with a negative return.183 These indications are currently evident with 
Pakistani backed militants gaining a level of power that has allowed them to move away 
from the state and become difficult for Pakistan to control. 
With Pakistan declaring itself a nuclear weapon state in 1998, Pakistan has moved 
into a new realm of risk with the employment of a proxy strategy that has proven the ability 
to operate unilaterally.184 The benefits seen to date of a proxy strategy successfully 
countering India in the Kashmir region without the involvement of conventional forces 
may not be a sustainable option. This proxy-client relationship issue is not a new 
phenomenon within Pakistani history; however, previous risks associated with the concern 
of a proxy client turning on the state were outweighed with Pakistan’s focus on its clients’ 
successes.185 The violent actions of clients such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammed on the population within the Kashmir region, and militants attacking 
government infrastructure and leaders are now highlighting the trade-offs made for what is 
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The conclusion will review the two arguments proposed in this thesis and their 
direct application to each of the case studies. It is ascertained that Iran’s employment of 
proxy clients will continue to remain a cost-effective means of expanding its influence and 
implementing Iranian foreign policy goals while retaining the ability to distance itself from 
the client as needed. This argument was expounded upon in the case study relating to Iran’s 
influence in Iraq, and the inroads paved through the influence of specific organizations that 
now fall under the PMF and their move into the Iraqi political construct.  
The Pakistani case study highlighted the critical point at which a proxy strategy 
may no be longer beneficial to a state because the client obtains an increased level of 
autonomous power. In terms of the case of Iran, it is already posed to counter this threat 
and distance itself from organizations such as KH, AAH, and Badr if this shift were to 
happen. Iran thus far has been successful with managing the balance between proxy clients 
and the relationships of political leaders within the Iraqi state. 
The two arguments within this thesis have direct implications on the PMF with 
Iran’s ability to continue to influence foreign policy and promote its state’s interest from 
abroad. As seen with the shift in Iraqi leadership, the topic of disbanding or integrating the 
PMF in the Iraqi military construct is gaining traction.  
B. PROXY CLIENTS REMAIN A COST EFFECTIVE AND LOW RISK 
OPTION 
Iran’s use of proxy clients as noted in Iraq is not employed to incite fear or terror 
amongst the populace. Instead, the client is aligned with Iran’s grand strategy and is a 
means of implementing and achieving the sponsor’s regional political agenda. The status 
that the Iraqi government will grant to the PMF will continue to be critical to Iran’s ability 
to have political influence within the Iraqi state. 
The large-scale success that the Iranian backed organizations have seen while 
fighting under the representation of the PMF has solidified the political representation that 
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the PMF leadership from organizations such as KH and AAH have come to enjoy within 
Iraqi. This political representation and independent military status that the PMF currently 
holds will cause any move made by the Iraqi parliament to reduce the power or disband the 
PMF and its umbrella organizations to be met with fierce resistance from those that 
currently hold their power through the PMF.  
Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, the current Iraqi Prime Minister experienced the PMF 
attempt to thwart his candidacy for prime minister as the PMF and Fatah Alliance saw him 
not only as willing to halt their expansion of power, but more importantly, having the 
determination to move in a direction that openly opposes the actions of those Iranian 
backed organizations.187 Kadhimi’s initiatives to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed 
organizations under the PMF such as KH and AAH is not new as both his predecessors 
attempted to but failed to make any strides within the Iraqi government; setting an example 
for future moves to discredit the Iranian backed organizations.188 KH has even openly 
accused Kadhimi as enabling the killing of both al-Muhandis and Soleimani. 
With the deaths of al-Muhandis and Soleimani, a major blow to the construct of the 
PMF was dealt that could have long-term political considerations. Both individuals were 
well versed in the domestic politics of Iraq and maintaining unity amongst the various 
organizations under the PMF umbrella.189 Abdulaziz al-Mohammadawi, the former 
secretary general of KH, replaced Muhandis as the deputy chairman of the PMF. In the 
wake of the death of both influential figures, it is argued that KH has been maintaining an 
inobtrusive quiet platform to alleviate the threat of additional kinetic actions against KH 
organizations operating under the PMF while other Iranian backed proxy clients can still 
maintain their current agenda regarding an anti-West stance.190 As Kadhimi continues to 
receive international pressure to disband or reduce the strength of the Iranian backed 
 
187 Chrispin Smith, “What’s next for Coalition Forces in Iraq?,” Middle East Institute, March 10, 
2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/whats-next-coalition-forces-iraq. 
188 Eli Manaker, “This Time Is Different: Can Iraq Rein in the PMF?,” Georgetown Security Studies 
Review, October 2, 2020, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2020/10/02/this-time-is-different-
can-iraq-rein-in-the-pmf/. 
189 Smith, “What’s next for Coalition Forces in Iraq?” 
190 Ibid. 
41 
organizations, Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian division within parliament may benefit from how 
ISIS has brought mutual agreements between Sunnis and Shiites. Instances of this are on 
display with Ayatollah Ali Sistani publicly insisting that “competition between parties and 
election candidates must center on economic, educational, and social service programs that 
can be realistically implemented; to be avoided are narcissism [and] inflammatory sectarian 
and nationalist rhetoric.”191 The current Iraqi political realm is moving in a direction that 
is less sectarian, to include the PMF, as seen with other elements such as Sunni, Christian 
and Kurdish organizations under the PMF umbrella. However, this poses an additional 
question for future scholarship as to will the political pacts that formed along a non-
sectarian line between Sunni and Shiite survive a future post ISIS Iraq? 
A complete shift away from an Iranian influence in Iraqi through its influence of 
Iraqi politics may never be possible, but more importantly, also may not be desired. Iran 
sees Kadhimi as an individual that will strive for a reduction in U.S. presence in Iraq. More 
so Kadhimi has openly addressed Iran in July 2020 that Iraq wants a relationship that is 
grounded on “the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of both countries” 
signaling that Kadkimi will not allow the U.S. to use Iraq as a proxy to stage any military 
attacks on Iran.192  
With Kadhimi, and Iran not openly opposing his appointment, it suggests that Iran 
has been successful with its goal of using its political reach through proxy clients to shape 
the nature of Iraqi politics and promoting Iran’s state interest of not allowing a security 
threat to immerge from Iraq. Kadhimi has gone as far as stating to the U.S. ambassador to 
Iraq that “Iraq will not be a ground for settling accounts and launching attacks on any 
neighboring or friendly country,” a stance that nestles within Iran’s grand strategy for the 
region.193 
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C. IRAN’S ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO RETAIN AND EMPLOY PROXY 
CLIENTS 
Utilizing Pakistan as a case study, the argument has been made that Pakistan’s 
prolonged use of a proxy strategy has been beneficial to the state and its rivalry with India 
but may now show signs of transitioning to a negative return.194 These signs are currently 
evidenced in Pakistani backed militants gaining a level of power that has allowed them to 
move away from the state and that is difficult for Pakistan to control. This observation may 
provide a better understanding into Iran’s future proxy employment. 
The correlation can be made to the current events taking place in Iraq between 
Shiite factions that once were armed and trained by Iran and fought against Sandam during 
the Iran-Iraq War. Specific Shiite factions are now beginning to distance themselves from 
relations with Iran and aligning with individuals such as the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani 
whose political views are non-Islamic and non-sectarian.195 Iran’s proxy clients are not 
rooted in the traditional terms of “terrorism” by targeting a population with a goal of 
installing fear.196 As seen in Pakistan, the employment of a proxy client is focused on 
achieving the sponsor’s political agenda and state objectives that are similar to Iran’s grand 
strategy. If all of Iran’s proxy clients were viewed with the label of “terrorist” and not as 
“state actors,” then identifying the link to Iran’s political motives would be difficult and a 
foreign policy response problematic. 197 Further, the U.S. has limited successes in 
countering Iranian proxies that would not climax into a conventional state on state conflict 
as seen with the escalation of tension after the drone strike killing Soleimani in 2020. 
As seen so far in Iran, even as the state moves towards the acquisition of nuclear 
deterrent capabilities, there may be a point in which Iran’s proxies may depreciate in value 
and become a determinant to its national security. If this shift does begin to occur, Iran 
could easily distance itself from its clients. Iran is already posed to counter this threat. In 
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the case of Pakistan, the state has maintained a more traditional “collective proxy strategy” 
as previous described by Mumford with managing proxy clients.198 Iran, however, has 
moved to a more informal method by managing proxy clients from a far. This may allow 
the state to easier distance itself from a previous client when it becomes a liability. This 
support can become dialed back when Iran must balance the support for its proxy clients 
under the PMF, and support for political leaders that align with Iranian interests. 
For Iran, the future of its state support to KH, AAH, and Badr under the PMF 
umbrella will remain bounded. This relationship is due to their efficiency to navigate the 
consequences imposed by Mumford’s theory of “interest, ideology, and risk” and the 
ability to have offensive and defensive capability that is cheaper than a conventional 
force.199  
D. IMPLICATIONS TO THE PMF: DISBAND OR INTEGRATE? 
The question to disband or integrate the PMF into the Iraqi military institution is 
rooted within the lessons learned from the U.S. disbanding the Iraqi Army after the Gulf 
War and the gap that the loss of employment created. The current documentation available 
reflects approximately 135,000 personnel incorporated under the PMF, with an authorized 
manpower of 160,000. Using the standard that an Iraqi household is comprised of six 
members, this employment data reflects that approximately 800,000 Iraqi’s are reliant on 
survivability of the PMF as a source of income.200 Given the societal norm of monetary 
support to extended families, this number may even be much larger. The result, if the PMF 
were disbanded, is that a large percent of the current Iraqi population will become directly 
affected. 
Due to the economic and employment factors that the organizations under the PMF 
provide, there are few viable options for the future context of these organizations. As 
proposed by Knights et al, “the reality is that there is no politically viable alternative to an 
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evolutionary, patient, but determined approach.”201 This means that the future of the PMF 
is not a short-term solution, but one that begins to address the long-term issue of defining 
the organization’s role as a military organization and furthering the professionalization and 
accountability of the forces. This is associated also with the international policy and 
assistance given to Iraq, in that the PMF has successfully cemented themselves into the 
Iraqi security construct. 
When considering the benefits of ether disbanding or integrating, the matter of the 
mission of the PMF must be taken into account. As described by Knights, Malik, Al-
Tamimi, the organization itself lacks a clearly defined role or mission even though it has 
been established and acknowledged by the host nation’s governing body but the PMF still 
lacks being a permanent ministry and having a set budget.202 The argument that the PMF 
is lacking a defined role within the Iraqi state construct means there is no formal training 
standard or accountability which leads to outside influence such as seen with Iran. If 
integration into the Iraqi Army were to take place, the proper vetting of the solders under 
the PMF must be upheld. By vetting individuals and utilizing the Iraqi legal system to hold 
a standard to individuals who have committed human rights abusees, this will not only give 
the current Iraqi government long-term stability and credibility, but further the start of 
discouraging future criminal activities amongst the ranks.203 
E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis proposes four policy recommendations that are associated with 
addressing the future of the PMF: 
1. Disbandment of the PMF should not be a viable option. The disbandment 
would lead to the organizations under the PMF becoming sectarian 
militias with no state control. The vacuum created by a large population of 
unemployed armed individuals may led to what occurred after the fall of 
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Sadam in 2003 with the disbandment of the Iraqi Army, and not 
restructuring the Iraqi military to maintain stability. This decision limited 
the ability of coalition forces to maintain security and the Iraqi 
government to maintain functionality after the U.S. invasion. In a study 
published in the Times Magazine, it is believed that 25 of the 40 top 
commanders within ISIS served previously in the Iraqi Army.204 
Individuals within the PMF should be vetted and integrated into the Iraqi 
Army so that accountability and standards can be maintained. 
2. The organizations under the PMF can also become integrated into the Iraqi 
Police force. It is assessed that the number of PMF members actively 
participating in combat is at minimum, an estimated 30,000 with the other 
members taking on a combat service support role and rear area 
security.205 In areas such as Diyala, Samara, and Tikrit which felt the 
effects of a ISIS occupation, a new void for security has been created that 
if left gapped, Sunni-led militias will develop that may not already exist 
under the current umbrella organization.206 There is currently a gap that 
requires security support before ISIS influence can reemerge.  
3. As seen with Israel’s “mabam” campaign against ISIS in Syria, the end-
states for a military campaign should be re-evaluated. Operation objectives 
that only require minimal coalition military involvement should be 
considered, which includes realist expectations set for both policy and 
decision makers on the attainable achievements of such a strategy.207 For 
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the U.S. and coalition support to Iraq, the development of both stability 
and legitimacy with the military forces must be achieved to bring 
credibility to the Iraqi state and leadership in Baghdad. Further, when the 
tactical objectives become unattainable, operations should be reduced.208 
4. An understanding by both decision and policy makers on the various 
elements that encompass the PMF is required to identify the separate 
organizations objectives, ideology, and the linage of the element to its 
leaders. When countering the different organizations backed by Iran, it is 
difficult to identify which organization may have conducted an attack 
within the region as seen with rocket attacks on U.S. installations and even 
the embassy in Baghdad.209 By understanding the political stance of 
organizations such as KH, AAH, and Badr organization, responses to 
future attacks can be formulated that take full advantage of the political 
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